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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)

CASE NO.

18202

)

VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)

. Defendant-Respondent.

)

Appellants, having been served with Respondent's
Brief, respectfully submit the following

R~ply

Brief, answer-

ing the new matters set forth in Respondent's Brief.

REPLY TO RESPONDENT' S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Although Respondent's Statement of the Facts is
basically correct, Appellants wish to call attention to some
of the misleading and incorrect statements found therein.
First, on page 3 of its Brief, Respondent refers to
"the contract to sell the seven (7) lotsn.

This is not

correct because this lawsuit does not involve all seven of the
original lots, but only four (4).

In addition, there are four

(4) separate contracts involved in this dispute rather than
just one.
Second, Respondent states that VANTAGE denies the
existence of a loan guarantee

(Brief of Respondent, page 3).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

However, the only representative of VANTAGE who was a party to
the contract negotiations was DOUG BOULTON and therefore, DOUG
BOULTON is the only witness who can affirm or deny, on behalf
of VANTAGE, the existence of a loan guarantee.

On both direct

and cross-examination Mr·. BOULTON testified that loan guarantees were periodically made. (Tr. pp. 77, 88).

ARGUMENT

I.

REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Respondent first complains that this case represents
an uncommon use of the Statute of Frauds as opposed to a
traditional use.

Respondent, however, has not cited any

authority for the proposition that there is a "traditional
use" of the Statute of Frauds.

The statutory language of the

Utah Statute of Frauds does not limit the application of the
statute in any way nor does it indicate a proper or traditional application.
tracts unenforceable.

The statute simply renders some conTherefore, Respondent' s argument that

this case represents an "uncommon" use of the Statute of
Frauds is entirely irrelevant.

A.

REPLY TO "SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM"

In addition to misinterpreting the applicable case
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law, Respondent has raised new matters which need some
attention.
Respondent cites Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196,
450 P.2d 467 (1967) for the rule that all that is required for
a writing to be sufficient "is that the interest be granted or
declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged"
(Brief of Respondent, page 8)

(Appellants cite Guinand

v.

Walton, supra, for the same rule; Brief of Appellants, page
27).

Respondent also relies on Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d

369 (Utah, 1980) for the proposition that where some "nexis"
is present, several writings may be construed together in
order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Appellants do not dispute these rules of law but·the
facts of this case establish that the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds have not been met even if all of the
writings are construed together.
In support of this position, Appellants submit that
Respondent has not produced a written instrument, or even
several writings construed together, which "grant" or
"declare" the property interest conveyed under the oral contract.

Appellants also submit that Respondent has failed to

establish that the clear requirements set forth in the Utah
Statute of Frauds have been met.
Section 25-5-1, u.c.A. 1953, as amended, states that
no interest in real property shall be created, granted,
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assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by deed or
conveyance in writing.

This section further requires that the

writing be "subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring" the interest or estate
conveyed.

Similarly, Section 25-5-3 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,

states in part:
"Every contract for • • • the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be
void unless the contract • • • is in writing
subscribed by the party by whom the lease
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent • • • "
In the case at bar there is no evidence of any written instrument containing the signature of Respondent' s agents
or respresentatives.

The signature of the party conveying the

property interest or selling the land is an essential element
in order to remove an oral contract from the Statute of
Frauds.
One other important clarification must be made.

On

page 9 of his Brief, Respondent has stated that "the writings
in this case consist of three (3) checks, a letter, and
detailed ledgers".

Even though the ledgers do not "grant" or

"declare" the property interest conveyed, Appellants maintain that these writings cannot be construed as part of the
contracts for the sale of the subject lots.

These writings

were introduced into evidence by an accountant (TR p. 97) for
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN.

They were created by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

accountant (after the sale) and not by the parties to the
contract negotiations and they only reflect accounting
en tr i es • ( TR p • 9 8 )
Thus, the only writings which can properly be construed together in an effort to meet the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds are the checks and the letter.

As stated

above, however, even when the ledgers are viewed along with
the other writings, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds
have not been met since all of the essential terms of the contracts are not contained therein.

Specifically, nowhere is

the property interest granted or declared (See Brief of Appellants, p. 28) and there is no writing subscribed by the
Respondent.

B.

REPLY TO "PART PERFORMANCE".

Respondent begins its argument under this issue by
restating (inaccurately) Appellants' argument on part performance found in the Opening Brief.

Appellants feel that the

argument has been properly stated in the Opening Brief and
that there is no need for Respondent's recharacterization.
Respondent next argues that rather than seven separate contracts for the seven lots, there was only one contract.

Respondent further argues that "there is substantial

evidence of record to support such a finding" (Brief of
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Respondent, p. 11) •

This "substantial evidence" is simply

not found in the record.

The facts set forth on page 11 of

Respondent's Brief do not constitute evidence of a single
contract.
Appellants' position as to the existence of seven
separate contracts is clearly set forth in the Opening Brief
(Brief of Appellants, p. 29) •

It is important to note, how-

ever, that even if there was only one contract, the resale of
three lots by Appellants still does not constitute part performance which will bring the oral contract out of the Statute
of Frauds.
If there was a single contract, both parties proceeded
as if the contract was severable as to each lot.

Severable or

divisible contracts are, in legal effect, made up of independent agreements about different subjects, made at the same
time.

Swinney v. Continental Bldg. Co., 340 Mo. 611, 102

S.W.2d 111 (1937).

Thus, if there is only one contract, that

contract is the subject of this lawsuit and it no longer includes that portion of the original agreement which has been
completely performed and severed.

At this time there is no

part performance other than part payment of the purchase price
on the contract.

This part payment does not remove the oral

contract from the Statute of Frauds. (See Brief of Appellants,
pp. 30-32)
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Respondent also complains that it should not be prevented from enforcing the contract because of the Statute of
Frauds and at the same time, prevented from denying the contract by reason of the Doctrine of Part Performance.
of Respondent, p. 11)

(Brief

This statement makes no sense because

the situation described by Respondent cannot possibly exist.
First, if the contract is void under the Statute of
Frauds, Respondent is permitted to deny it.

On the other

hand, if the Doctrine of Part Performance is applicable, the
Statute of Frauds is not.

In other words, the Doctrine of

Part Performance and the effects of the Statute of Frauds
cannot apply to the same contract.

In view of this, Respon-

dent does not need to caution the Court on the application of
the Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Part Performance.
(Brief of Respondent, p. 11)
Another new issue raised by Respondent is that the
Doctrine of Part Performance must be available to the seller
if it is available to the buyer.

Appellants agree that the

Doctrine is available to the seller of real property if the
seller has done something which constitutes part performance.
The seller cannot rely on the part performance of the buyer to
enforce an oral contract which falls within the Statute of
Frauds.

Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Mjn. Co.,

103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1934); Schwedes y. Romain, 587
P.2d 388 (Mont. 1978); Brief of Appellants, pp. 29-30.
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Finally, it should be noted that Respondent has misstated the facts in its factual summary found on page 12 of
its Brief.

Both parties do not admit the existence of one

contract5
The undisputed facts clearly establish that the
parties entered into an oral contract for the sale of land.
The Respondent, as the party seeking to establish that the
contract can be saved from the Statute of Frauds, has the
burden of so proving.

Appellants strongly maintain that the

Respondent failed to carry this burden, and that the trial
court erroneously found that the Statute of Frauds did not
apply.

II.

This error alone warrants a reversal.

REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Respondent begins its argument by restating and recharacterizing the arguments set forth in Appellants' Brief.
As stated above, Appellants feel that the arguments are
properly stated in the Opening Brief and there is no need for
Respondent's recharacterization.

Moreover, Respondent mis-

states Appellants' argument by characterizing "the thrust" of
all of Appellants' arguments in terms of a single finding of
fact.

Although Appellants do contend that Finding of Fact No.

11 is erroneous, Appellants' arguments go well beyond the
scope of this finding.

(i.e., Appellants' argument as to the
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Statute of Frauds does not depend upon the finding that the
guarantee was made.)
Also, the statement found in Finding No. 11 that "The
most convincing evidence is that no employee of VANTAGE CORPORATION or its parent, DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, had authority to bind the Association to make a
future loan" is misleading as to the applicable law.

{This

point is more fully discussed below.)

A.

REPLY TO "VANTAGES' ANSWER"

Respondent relies heavily on the argument that Appellants knew all along that Respondent would dispute the existence of

~he

guarantee.

{Brief of Respondent, p. 16)

This,

however, has little or nothing to do with the applicable law
since the existence of a judicial admission does not depend on
the opposing party's reliance thereon.

As Respondent has

stated, this admission is a judicial admission {Brief of
Respondent, p. 17) and should be given the evidentiary weight
accorded to such admissions.

(See Appellants' Brief, pp.

18-21)

B.

REPLY TO "TESTIMONY OF APPELLANTS"

As more fully explained in the Opening Brief {pages
8-18), the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
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no guarantee of construction financing was made.

Under point

II(B) of its Brief, Respondent argues that this finding was
not an abuse of discretion.

In support of this argument,

Respondent cites DeVas y. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290
(1962) and Anderson y. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583
P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) •
On page 18 of its Brief, Respondent states that in
DeVas v. Noble, supra, this court affirmed a "ruling in favor
of the defendant despite the uncontradicted direct testimony
of the plaintiff".

This is incorrect.

The plaintiff, Hattie

DeVas, prevailed in the trial court and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
In DeVas, the central question was whether the Statute
of Limitations had run before the plaintiff commenced her
action.

Even though the plaintiff made statements which,

under more normal circumstances, would have established that
the Statute had run, the court found that the plaintiff's
action was timely filed.

The trial court found that the

plaintiff had "such mental limitations that her testimony is
unreliable" and refused to be bound by the prior "erratic
statements".
In addition, the trial court did not believe the
defendant' s testimony stating that his "account of things is
obviously false".
Thus, the DeVas decision does not in any way support
Respondent's conclusion that a ruling was made (and affirmed)
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for one party despite the uncontradicted direct testimony of
the other party.
In addition, the rules of law set forth in Devas and
in Anderson y. State Farm, supra, do not give the trial judge
the prerogative to ignore uncontradicted testimony.

In fact,

the DeVas court specifically held that credible, uncontradicted evidence cannot be ignored when all reasonable minds
would accept it.

There is nothing in the record which mini-

mizes the credibility of the Appellants or indicates that
their testimony is not trustworthy.
In order to find in favor of the Respondent, the trial
court had to first ignore the clear, unequivocal testimony of
both appellants and then, despite the absence of substantiating testimony, find that no guarantee was made.
It is important to note here that Appellants did not
have to proye the existence of an enforceable guarantee.
Appellants are entitled to rescision even where innocent and
unintentional representations are made which would lead
appellants to believe that construction financing was guaranteed.

(See Appellants' Opening Brief, pages 21-25)
Thus, even if the testimony of appellants is given

almost no weight or credibility it stands uncontradicted and
cannot be completely ignored.

At an extreme minimum, the

testimony of Appellants establishes that statements were made
to them which led them to believe that construction financing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

on the Blackhawk Estates lots was guaranteed.
VANTAGE'

DOUG BOULTON,

s agent, made those statements.
C.

REPLY TO "THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING"

Appellants submit that part C of Point II of Respondent' s Brief illustrates that there is virtually no evidence
to support the lower court's finding that the guarantee was
not made.
First, Respondent asserts that a mere passage of time,
coupled with the resale of some of the lots, constitutes
"evidence" that the guarantee was not made.

No authority is

cited for this proposition and Appellants submit that if the
passage of time is "evidence", it tends to support the fact
that the guarantee was made.

·.

Appellant, LARRY GLEIM, testi-

fied that Respondent guaranteed the availability of construction financing "when we were ready to build homes". (TR p. 60)
Also, on cross-examination, Appellant, CARL BALDWIN, testified
as follows:
"Q
You didn't expect the conditions that
existed in 1978 to exist forever in that
situation, did you?

A
I never really gave it much thought.
I always thought that the loan would be
guaranteed.
Q
right?

All right.

Under any circumstances,
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~;

A
If we went in and asked for that loan
and were able to make that loan, yes, I did
assume that we would get that loan." (Tr. p. 39)
Thus, a lapse of almost two years is supportive of
Appellants' claim that the construction financing would be
available to them when they were ready to build.
Respondent' s next argument concerning the statements
of Mr. DOUG BOULTON (Brief of Respondent, p. 20) again illustrates the absence of evidence contrary to Appellants' claim
that a guarantee was made to them.

First, Mr. BOULTON did

testify as to his training and background but these comments
must be viewed in light of Mr. BOULTON' s entire testimony.
(Tr. pp. 74-75)

In connection with this, Appellants direct

the Court's attention to pages 13-15 of their Opening Brief.
In view of Mr. BOULTON' s entire testimony, it is clear that
his training and background has very little (if any) probative
value as to the issue of whether the guarantee was actually
made.
Finally, Respondent has heavily relied upon the testimony of Mr. PREBIN NIELSON to establish that neither Respondent nor its agent, DOUG BOULTON, nor anyone else at DESERET
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION had the authority to
commit the Association to make a loan in the future.
of Respondent, p. 20)

(Brief

Somehow, Respondent interprets this

testimony as "evidence" that the guarantee was not made.
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In an effort to be brief, the history of the law on
apparent and implied authority will not be reviewed.

The

undisputed facts establish that during the contract negotiations Appellants had reason to believe they were dealing not
only with VANTAGE CORPORATION but also with a lending institution:

DESERET FEDERAL.

All of the meetings were held in

the offices of DESERET FEDERAL and Mr. DOUG BOULTON was an
employee of both VANTAGE and DESERET FEDERAL.

Thus, VANTAGE

CORPORATION created circumstances which led Appellants to
believe that Mr. BOULTON had the authority to commit VANTAGE
and DESERET FEDERAL to provide construction loans for the
Blackhawk Estates lots.

It is a well settled rule of law that

principles are bound by the acts of their agents when the
agents' acts fall within the apparent scope of their authority
and the principal will be bound where innocent third parties
have dealt with the agent in good faith.

Skerel v, Willow

Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P.2d 502 (1937); Santi y.
Denyer and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 12 Utah 2d 157,
442 P.2d 921 (1968).
In addition to being clothed with the apparent
authority to make a loan guarantee, Mr. BOULTON had the
implied authority to do so.

Here, VANTAGE CORPORATION was

trying to sell subdivision lots to homebuilders.

DESERET

FEDERAL, the parent corporation of VANTAGE, is a lending
institution and carries on a profitable business by extending
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loans.

This combination of business objectives justifies the

guarantee of construction loans as an incentive to persuade
potential buyers to purchase the subdivision lots from
VANTAGE.
"The actual authority of an agent may be
implied from the words and conduct of the
parties and the facts and circumstances
attending the transaction in question.
Implied authority embraces authority to
do whatever acts are incidental to, or
are necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform, the main authority
expressly delegated to the agent."
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah, 1978)
In view of the applicable case law and the undisputed
facts of this case, it is abundantly clear that Mr •. NIELSON'

s

testimony as to the authority expressly given to Mr. BOULTON
does not constitute "evidence" that the guarantee was not
made.

CONCLUSION

The record below and the briefs of both counsel filed
herein lead to the conclusion that the trial court should have
ruled in favor of the Appellants.

Therefore, Appellants again

respectfully request this court to reverse the trial court's
judgment and require the trial court to enter judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff' s and against the Defendant in the sum
of $9,371.80 plus costs of court· and interest at the legal
rate.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~y

of

1982.
HARDING & HARDING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) copies of the foregoing
Appellants' Reply Brief were mailed to:
EDWARD M. GARRETT
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411)/
DATED

.
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